Foreign relations of the united states, 1969

Is there anything else khổng lồ add?

Johnson: The Dienbienphu factor, that is, building up Long Tieng as a turning point of the struggle in Laos.

Kissinger: The President’s preference 2 has not abated.

Cushman: I doubt the Lao, Meo, & Thai could fight a Dienbienphu-type battle.

Kissinger: The President wants lớn know whether, if we move in a bầu battalion, the enemy could then isolate it.

Wheeler: Sure they could but it would be a difficult operation. I don’t think the Meo và Thai would sit in Long Tieng for a long siege. They would just fade into the bush.

Johnson: I am still worried about building Long Tieng up as the key battle for control of Laos.

Kissinger: The President also has lớn weigh the deterrent effect of the thai forces against the possibility that their presence will stimulate a North Vietnamese attack.

Green: That is a real possibility.

Wheeler: But just a possibility.

Green: Our Lao specialists feel it is an important consideration.

Kissinger: Option 2 would be to lớn tell Souvanna & Thanat we are willing to prepare a full RCT of three battalions for introduction into Laos at a later date. We would give a firm commitment for this. We would propose arrangements for consulting on when và where to lớn use the thai troops.

The arguments in favor are: 1) It would avoid the danger of a disaster involving substantial bầu forces at Long Tieng (although there are Thais there now). 2) It would permit a favorable response to lớn Souvanna và Thanat. 3) Our domestic position would be better. We would not be taking action until North Vietnamese intentions became unambiguous. We would have shown restraint in the face of earlier earnest appeals. 4) Since it is not certain the North Vietnamese intend lớn go beyond Long Tieng, we might not have lớn move the Thais at all.

The arguments against are: 1) It would give Souvanna less than he has asked for. He might be led to lớn seek a khuyễn mãi giảm giá with the North Vietnamese. 2) If we wait, we may find ourselves in a worse position later. The North Vietnamese would have moved closer to the bầu border, effectiveness of the Lao forces would be less and our commitment would be greater. Our commitment would then be greater. 3) It would be difficult to lớn avoid linkage khổng lồ SEATO and Plan Taksin.

Johnson: The importance of some of those latter points against would be affected by whether or not we hold Long Tieng.

Kissinger: If Long Tieng falls, , we could still have another look about whether to make a formal commitment of bầu forces. Option 2 would commit us to the introduction of regular thai units. If, under those circumstances, the Thais are overrun, we would face a real problem. One of the important policy decisions would be at what point to lớn remove the Thais. Having Thais in Long Tieng would be different from a formal commitment lớn move in a thai regiment with U.S. Assistance on the Vietnam model. If that were khổng lồ fail, the Thais would really be dealt a blow. 800 Thais, on the other hand, could be considered merely an extension of Sierra Romeo.

Green: There will still be a problem.

Kissinger: We have khổng lồ consider whether to lớn face it under existing conditions or with a formal commitment.

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Packard: It would be better under existing conditions.

Kissinger: Option 2 gets us out of a decision on Long Tieng, but it gets us involved in a commitment.

Packard: We could avoid a firm commitment by telling Souvanna & Thanat we would “consult on appropriate steps”.

Johnson: My draft is along these lines. It says that commitment of bầu troops is subject to lớn agreement of the three governments. The message to Souvanna says: “Should the North Vietnamese army advance beyond Long Tieng, the United capnuochaiphong.coms is prepared to support the introduction of thai forces into Laos at a time & under conditions agreed by the three governments”.3

Kissinger: How naive is Souvanna?

Wheeler: Not particularly, according to our reports.

Johnson: Souvanna goes up & down. He has often cried wolf.

Kissinger: Since the other two governments already agree, we are the missing element. What we would be saying is “we will tư vấn if we will support”.

Green: It will be interesting khổng lồ have Unger’s comments. The Thais are mortally afraid of making their involvement public. They fear what will happen if bầu troops are defeated under such circumstances.

Kissinger: If forces are used, the Thais’ need for our support may not eventuate.

Green: The Thais want to involve us. They consider that U.S. Involvement is tantamount khổng lồ victory.

Cushman: There already is a battalion of bầu artillery at Long Tieng.

Kissinger: (to Johnson) Your idea is that the North Vietnamese won’t go beyond Long Tieng & that the Thais won’t accept open involvement of their forces?

Johnson: Generally that is not a bad capnuochaiphong.comment.

Green: Our caveats will go down hard with the Thais.

Johnson: We have asked Unger’s views on a whole range of questions concerned with thai involvement. (Reads sections of outgoing cable khổng lồ Bangkok.)4

Kissinger: As put in that cable, I can tell what Unger’s answer will be. What we want is his assessment of the overall political impact in xứ sở của những nụ cười thân thiện of our refusal to tư vấn introduction of thai troops.

Johnson: That was the first question in the cable.

Kissinger: The President has asked why we should acknowledge publicly moving thai troops if we bởi so. Why not say that we are continuing Sierra Romeo?

Packard: It would be better not to move bầu troops.

Kissinger: This suggests that thai involvement would have to be public. This terrifies the Thais.

Johnson: I cabled Unger that it would be virtually impossible to cover up bầu involvement.

Kissinger: We can’t go much further without hearing from Unger.

Johnson: (to Kissinger) I’d lượt thích you to look at the drafts of responses we prepared.

Kissinger: Let me đánh giá individual positions .5 Defense is against primarily for domestic political reasons. (Packard agrees.) capnuochaiphong.com is against for reasons we have discussed.

Wheeler: On purely military grounds we are more for than against. However, we think it is not primarily a military problem; it is a political problem.